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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Matthew Allen Allmaras appeals from

relinquishment of jurisdiction.
rights

and

Statement

that

one of the

Of The

Facts

He

argues that the district court violated his Fifth

district court

Amendment

was ambiguous.

district court’s orders

And Course Of The Proceedings

Matthew Allen Allmaras entered an
The

the district court’s revocation 0f his probation and

m1

plea t0 injury t0 a child.

(46817 R., p.94.2)

imposed a sentence of ten years with three years ﬁxed, suspended the sentence,

and placed Allmaras 0n probation for four years.

(45821 R., pp.158-60.3)

As

a condition of

The

probation, the district court required Allmaras to spend 180 days in jail. (45821 R., p.163.)

condition noted that Allmaras would be released early if he “pass[ed] a full disclosure polygraph”

and would be sent on a rider

if he failed the

polygraph 0r failed t0 take the polygraph. (45821 R.,

p.163.)

Allmaras ﬁled a Rule 35 motion for modiﬁcation of sentence in which he argued that the
condition of probation requiring

Amendment

rights.

him

to pass a ﬁlll disclosure

(46817 R., pp.150-52.)

At a hearing 0n

the Rule 35 motion, Allmaras’s

counsel sought clariﬁcation 0n the polygraph probation condition.

1

2

North Carolina
Citations t0

ﬁle with the
3

(1 1/7/20 1 7 Tr., p.5, Ls.1 1-23.4)

Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

“46817 R.”

title starting

refer t0 the record for Case No. 46817, Which can be found in the
“Clerk Record Appeal Volume 1 6-27-2019.”

Citations to “45821 R.” refer to the record for Case

ﬁle With the
4

V.

polygraph violated his Fifth

title starting

While the various

t0

ﬁnd

N0. 45821, which can be found in the
“Supplemental Clerk Record Appeal Volume 1 11-30-2018.”

transcripts

the transcripts

2019,” Which contains

is

the

all

make multiple appearances

PDF

ﬁle With the

in the record, the

title starting

0f the transcripts in a single ﬁle.

PDF
PDF

most convenient place

“Transcript Appeal

Volume

1

6-27-

The

Allmaras could

district court clariﬁed that

start his rider

immediately

he chose not to

if

participate in the polygraph rather than wait in the jail for the 180 days to run. (1 1/7/2017 Tr., p.5,

L.24 — p.7, L.2.) After hearing that clariﬁcation, Allmaras’s counsel decided t0 Withdraw the Rule
35 motion.
clearly

(1

1/7/2017 Tr., p.7, Ls.3-14

what the Court’s

The

withdraw the Rule 35

now

that

understand more

I

intent was.”).)

The discussion then turned
p.7, Ls.9-25.)

(“I’ll

district court

to

how

to start Allmaras’s rider immediately.

found “the appropriate procedural thing

t0

(1

d0 would be for

[Allmaras] to admit that he violated his probation at this time by not getting a

polygraph.”

(1

1/7/2017 Tr., p.7, Ls.18-24.)

1/7/2017 Tr.,

full

disclosure

Allmaras’s counsel asserted that she read the

probation condition differently: in her View, Allmaras’s decision not to take the polygraph was not
a Violation of his probation because he

probation.

(11/7/2017

was choosing an option provided

L.25 — p.9, L.16.)

Tr., p.8,

condition, the district court observed that they

(1

[the]

probation Violation.”

(1

Given the disagreement over the probation

were “back

1/7/2017 Tr., p.13, Ls.23-24.) Allmaras chose t0

in the conditions of his

to

needing t0 argue the Rule 35.”

move forward With an “admit/deny hearing on

1/7/2017 Tr., p.15, Ls. 14-21.) Allmaras then denied that he violated

the polygraph term of his probation (1 1/7/2017 Tr., p.15, L.22

scheduled an evidentiary hearing

(1

— p.18,

L.15), and the district court

1/7/2017 Tr., p.20, Ls.1 1-18). At the end 0f what had

become

a joint Rule 35 and admit/deny hearing, Allmaras’s counsel indicated that she wanted to “leave the

[Rule 35] motion on the table.”

At

(1

1/7/2017 Tr., p.21, Ls.1 1-13.)

the subsequent evidentiary hearing

0n the probation

argued that “the probation Violation hasn’t been shown.”

Violation, Allmaras’s counsel

(1/30/2018

Tr., p.4,

Ls.12-15.)

She

continued t0 press her argument that the probation condition gave Allmaras options and choosing

one of those options was not a Violation 0f probation:

Number 21, it
he’s
not gotten the polygraph at this
gives him three options. And I believe that
point. I don’t believe the 180 days has expired, so I don’t believe he’s violated that
So, your Honor, Ibelieve that the

way it’s

phrased in the Condition

in that time period.

(1/30/2018

Tr., p.6, Ls.5-9.)

The

district court rejected

Allmaras had violated his probation. (1/30/2018

The

and retained jurisdiction for up

t0

one year. (1/30/2018

explained t0 Allmaras that he “need[ed] t0 pass

T11, p.7,

it

Tr., p.6,

on his rider 0r the

[a] full

acts.”

district court

p.9, Ls.

T11,

1

8-22.)

Ls.17-22.)

The

district court

would “impose the prison sentence.”

meant a polygraph “regarding the event

(1/30/2018

L.16.)

then

disclosure polygraph regarding the events

L.17 — p.8, L.22.) Allmaras’s counsel asked the

it

— p.7,

Tr., p.7,

meant by a “full disclosure polygraph.” (1/30/2018 TL,

said that

L.21

imposed Allmaras’s prison sentence of ten years with three years ﬁxed

district court

in question” while

Allmaras’s counsel’s argument and found

(1/3 0/20 1 8

district court for clariﬁcation as to

p.8,

L.24 — p.9, L. 17.) The

What

district court

and any other

in question with this

Allmaras’s counsel objected to the

district court’s

requirement as a Violation ofAllmaras’s Fifth Amendment rights. (1/3 0/2018 TL, p.9, L.23 — p. 10,
L. 1 8.)

The

But

don’t see a polygraph that details his knowledge of the events in question,

I

if I

Will

district court

responded: “[Y]0u’re going to have t0 advise your client appropriately.

impose the prison sentence.”

explained

to

Allmaras

the

(1/30/2018

requirement

Tr., p.10, Ls.22-25.)

The

I

guarantee you

district court

then

and Allmaras acknowledged he understood the

requirement:

THE COURT:

If

you don’t have a polygraph

question, Iwill impose your prison sentence.

THE DEFENDANT:
(1/30/2018

at least

concerning the events in

Do you understand that?

Yes.

Tr., p.1 1, Ls.8-12.)

In

its

order of retained jurisdiction, the district court wrote that

Allmaras “needs to pass a faH—diseleswce polygraph regarding the events in question on August

9,

2014.”

(45821 R., p.150 (strikethrough in original; capitalization

initialed

and dated next

to the hand-written strikethrough

altered).)

The

district court

0f “ﬁlll disclosure.” (45821 R., p.150.)

Allmaras completed his period 0f retained jurisdiction.

(Conf. Docs., pp.51-55.)

The

program manager and case manager recommended “the court consider placing [Allmaras] on
probation.” (Conf. Docs., p.55.) Allmaras’s counsel asked the district court t0 put Allmaras on
probation, and the state simply noted that Allmaras had not submitted the results 0f a polygraph.

(1/17/2019

The

Tr., p.16,

L.22 — p.20, L.15.)

district court

imposed Allmaras’s sentence 0f ten years With three years ﬁxed.

(1/17/2019 TL, p.21, Ls.5-8.) The district court explained
disclosure polygraph because of Idaho case law,”

[Allmaras] t0 take a polygraph t0
Ls.9-17.)

The

district court

ﬁnd

it

that,

While

it

acted “within

could not require a “full

out about the events in question.”

explained that

it

discretion to order

[its]

(1/17/2019

needed the polygraph “t0 know

Who

[it

Tr., p.21,

was] dealing

with” because “there’s clearly two different stories” between Allmaras and the Victim. (1/ 17/2019
T11, p.21,

L.18 — p.22, L.7.)

Allmaras ﬁled an amended Rule 35 motion. (46817 R., pp.250-53.)
probation condition requiring his submission to a polygraph violated his Fifth

(468 1 7 R., pp.25 1 -52.) The

district court

argued that the

Amendment rights.

denied the Rule 35 motion 0n the basis that a requirement

for a polygraph limited t0 the facts 0f the crime

not have violated Allmaras’s Fifth

He

0f conviction

Amendment rights.

is

not incriminating and thus could

{4/3/2019 Tr., p.13, L.16

— p. 1 5,

Allmaras timely appealed. (46817 R., pp.272-77, 310-15; 45821 R., pp.152-56.)

L. 1 8.)

ISSUES
Allmaras

states the issues

Whether the

I.

0n appeal

as:

district court violated

Mr. Allmaras’s Fifth Amendment rights

by revoking his probation based 0n his reﬁlsal t0 waive those rights and
participate in a full-disclosure polygraph.
Whether the

II.

district court erred

by

relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr.

Allmaras based on a provision which was neither speciﬁc 0r distinct enough
t0

be an enforceable order.

Mr. Allmaras’s Fifth Amendment rights
by relinquishing jurisdiction based on his failure t0 take a polygraph
examination after it had put him in the classic penalty scenario.

Whether the

III.

district court violated

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

The
I.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Allmaras

when
II.

it

failed t0

show that the

district court violated his Fifth

Amendment rights

revoked his probation?

Has Allmaras

failed t0

show that the

district court

erroneously relinquished jurisdiction

over Allmaras because a provision was not sufﬁciently speciﬁc or distinct?

III.

Has Allmaras

failed

to

show

that

the

district

Amendment rights by relinquishing jurisdiction?

court violated Allmaras’s

Fifth

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Revoked Allmaras’s Probation For Refusing
A.

A Polygraph

To Take

Introduction

The

district court

ordered as a condition 0f probation that Allmaras take a full-disclosure

polygraph about the crime 0f conviction. Allmaras objected to that condition as a Violation of his
Fifth

Amendment

Fifth

Amendment rights because

B.

Standard

The

rights.

may

limited the polygraph t0 the crime 0f conviction.

freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles.”

State V. Perez, 164 Idaho 626,

A

it

found that the condition did not Violate Allmaras’s

Of Review

“[T]his Court

C.

district court

628 (2019).

Probation Condition Requiring

A

Polygraph Does Not Necessarily Violate The Fifth

Amendment

A district court can,

in

some circumstances, order an

condition 0f probation Without Violating the Fifth

individual t0 take a polygraph as a

Amendment.

The

Fifth

Amendment

t0 the

United States Constitution protects against compelled self—incrimination. U.S. Const. amend. V.
“It

has long been held that this prohibition not only permits a person t0 refuse t0 testify against

himself at a criminal
questions put to

trial in

him

in

Which he

is

a defendant, but also ‘privileges

any other proceeding,

civil or criminal,

him not t0 answer ofﬁcial

formal or informal, where the

answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.” Minnesota
420, 426 (1984) (quoting Leﬂ<owitz
lose this protection

by reason of

imprisoned or 0n probation

at the

V. Turlev,

414 U.S.

his conviction

70, 77 (1973)).

V.

“A

Murphy, 465 U.S.

defendant does not

of a crime; notwithstanding that a defendant

time he makes incriminating statements

.”
.

.

.

I_d.

is

A state can, however,

compel answers from a probationer

in future criminal proceedings.

ﬂQ

at

435

n.7.

that

For example, a

would not incriminate him

state

could demand answers

from a probationer about a residential restriction imposed as a condition ofprobation, even if “such
questions might reveal a Violation of the residential requirement and result in the termination of

probation” because “a revocation proceeding
States V. Locke,

482 F.3d 764, 767 (5th

state required probationer to

Cir.

.

.

.

is

not a criminal proceeding.”

2007) (holding Fifth

I_d.;

ﬂ

M

Amendment not violated where

answer questions about pornography because “these questions

attempted to ascertain Whether [the probationer] had violated conditions of his probation, and [the
probationer’s] answers could not serve as a basis for a future criminal prosecution”).

Applying these principles, the Idaho Court oprpeals has held

impose a term 0f probation “that may lead

that a district court can also

t0 incriminating questions.”

State V.

Widmyer, 155

Idaho 442, 446-47, 313 P.3d 770, 774-75 (Ct. App. 2013) (emphasis added). But “the defendant

does not, by Virtue 0f accepting the term[], waive the right to assert the Fifth
the questions are presented.”

Li. at

445-47, 313 P.3d at 773-75.

“Thus, a

Amendment when
district court

may

lawfully impose a psychosexual evaluation [that includes a polygraph] as a condition of probation
as part of a defendant’s rehabilitation.”

evaluation With a polygraph

Li (holding probation condition requiring “a psychosexual

exam” was “a lawful condition of probation”).

Here, the district court lawfully required Allmaras, as a condition 0f probation, “to submit
to a

polygraph exam”

rehabilitation.

at the request

0f his probation ofﬁcer or “any therapist” as part 0f his

(9/7/2017 Tr., p.15, Ls.3-5;

ﬂ

45821

R., p.164.)

And, because

that

polygraph

may have led t0 incriminating questions, Allmaras retained his right t0 assert the Fifth Amendment
in response to

any incriminating questions

445-47, 313 P.3d at 773-75.

in the

polygraph exam.

E

Widmyer, 155 Idaho

at

The

district court,

the events in question.”

believed

it

however, also required a separate
(9/7/2017 T11, p.15, Ls.6-16;

ﬂ

“full disclosure

45821

polygraph regarding

R., p.163.)

The

could require a polygraph about the crime 0f conviction because, in the

district court

district court’s

View, the risk of incrimination ended after Allmaras entered his plea and the district court imposed

its

sentence. (4/3/2019 Tr., p. 14, L.22

— p.15, L.12

only dealt with the act that he had pled guilty
different crime as a result of those questions”

(explaining that “the questions sought would’ve

to,

and

and the State can’t charge any additional or

“I can’t

impose a

different sentence as a result

0f any responses to those questions”).)
“It is true, as

a general rule, that where there can be no further incrimination, there

basis for the assertion of the privilege.” Mitchell V. United States, 526 U.S. 3 14,

state notes,

the

however, that

this “principle applies t0 cases in

judgment of conviction has become

final.”

I_d.

is

no

326 (1999). The

Which the sentence has been ﬁxed and

Put differently, only “[i]f n0 adverse

consequences can be Visited upon the convicted person by reason of further testimony, then there
is

n0

further incrimination to

The question

be feared.”

I_d.5

for this Court, then, is

Whether Allmaras’s sentence had been ﬁxed and his

judgment of conviction had become ﬁnal by the time the
ﬁlll

ordered Allmaras to take a

disclosure polygraph about the crime 0f conviction as a condition of probation.

the state acknowledges that Allmaras timely appealed

pp.152-56), and his appeal

5

district court

The

(i.e.,

this appeal) is still

state also notes the distinction

To

that end,

from the judgment of conviction (45821

R.,

pending (3/22/2019 Order Granting Motion to

between requiring an individual

t0 divulge speciﬁc facts

and

information about the crime of conviction and drawing negative inferences from the defendant’s
general “[un]willingness t0 cooperate.” State V. Jimenez, N0. 42098, 2015
7785141, at *3-4

WL

(Idaho Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2015) (concluding “that Mitchell does not prohibit a sentencing court from
considering a defendant’s invocation 0f his 0r her Fifth

Amendment

privilege t0 refuse

participation in the psychosexual evaluation as part of determining an appropriate sentence”).

E

Consolidate).

becomes ﬁnal

State V. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355,

“either

by

79 P.3d 71

1,

714 (2003) (holdingjudgment

expiration of the time for appeal 0r afﬁrmance 0f the

judgment 0n

appeal”).

II.

Allmaras Has Failed To
A.

Show That The

District

Court Gave

An Ambiguous

Order

Introduction

The

district court

ordered Allmaras to take a polygraph about the crime of conviction

during the time the district court retained jurisdiction, and that order was speciﬁc and distinct. The

language of the order communicated t0 Allmaras that he was required t0 take the polygraph:
“defendant needs t0 pass a polygraph regarding the events in question 0n August
R., p.

1

50 (emphasis and capitalization

district court

altered).)

expressly told Allmaras that

it

9,

2014.” (45821

Moreover, when explaining the written order, the

would “impose

[his]

prison sentence” unless he “ha[d]

a polygraph at least concerning the events in question,” and Allmaras told the district court that he

understood the requirement. (1/30/2018

Tr., p.1 1, Ls.8—12.)

Thus, based 0n the plain language 0f

the order and the district court’s explanation 0f the order to Allmaras, the order

was speciﬁc and

deﬁnite rather than ambiguous.

B.

Standard

Of Review

This Court freely reviews Whether a
State V.

C.

district court’s

order

was speciﬁc and

deﬁnite.

E

Le Vegue, 164 Idaho 110, 116-17, 426 P.3d 461, 467-68 (2018).

The

The

And Distinctly Told Allmaras That He Had To Take
Of Conviction To Avoid Prison After His Rider

District Court Speciﬁcally

Polygraph About The Crime
district court’s

both speciﬁc and

distinct.

order that Allmaras take a polygraph about the crime of conviction

A

district court

can relinquish jurisdiction

if the

defendant

A

was

fails t0

comply with a lawfully issued
467 (2018).

was

E

order.

Le Vague, 164 Idaho 110, 116, 426 P.3d 461,

State V.

A lawful order must be “speciﬁc” and “deﬁnite as t0 what

directed.”

it

required and t0

Whom it

I_d.

For example, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a

district court

cannot relinquish

ﬂ

jurisdiction based

0n the defendant’s

Q

the district court revoked the defendant’s probation, retained jurisdiction, and

In

Le Vegue,

included this statement in

after

order:

I_d.

have made the

that is not speciﬁc or deﬁnite.

[a separate] crime,

(capitalization altered;

found two problems with

obey an order

“The court speciﬁcally recommends sex offender treatment

he fully discloses his involvement in

with a polygraph.”

Who

its

failure t0

this order:

First,

district court’s desires

it

and

that his disclosure is veriﬁed

emphasis removed).

“did not use a term like

unambiguous commands.”

The Idaho Supreme Court
‘shall’ or ‘must’ that

Second,

Li.

“it

would

[was] unclear

the subject 0f the recommendation [was]” between the defendant and the Department of

Corrections.

Li Thus,

the Idaho

Supreme Court held

jurisdiction because the order the defendant violated

the district court erroneously relinquished

was not speciﬁc 0r

deﬁnite. Li.

Here, the order was speciﬁc and deﬁnite. Unlike the order in Le Vegue, Which did not use
a term indicating the necessity of complying with the request, the order here expressly stated that

“defendant needs t0 pass a polygraph regarding the events in question 0n August
R.,

p.150

(capitalization

and

emphasis

altered»;

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/need

ﬂ

Need,

9,

2014.” (45821

Merriam-Webster

(last Visited Jan. 13,

Online,

2020) (deﬁning need as

“necessary duty”). And, also unlike in Le Vegue, the district court explained the requirement t0
Allmaras, and Allmaras indicated that he understood the requirement. (1/3 0/2018

12);

and

c_f.

Le Vague, 164 Idaho

district court t0

at 116,

426 P.3d

at

467 (using exchange between defense counsel

support conclusion a written order

10

Tr., p.1 1, Ls.8-

was ambiguous). Because

the district court

indicated Allmaras “need[ed]” to have a polygraph and reviewed that order with Allmaras in open

court, the order

was speciﬁc and deﬁnite

rather than ambiguous.

III.

The
A.

District

Court Relinquished Jurisdiction Based

On Allmaras’s Refusal To Take A Polygraph

Introduction

The

district court

ordered Allmaras t0 take a polygraph about the crime 0f conviction

during the period of retained jurisdiction and subsequently relinquished jurisdiction over Allmaras

When he refused t0 d0
his Fifth

Amendment

Allmaras’s Fifth

B.

Standard

Allmaras obj ected to the relinquishment ofjurisdiction as a Violation of

so.

rights.

The

district court

Amendment rights because

it

found the polygraph requirement did not Violate

limited the polygraph t0 the crime of conviction.

Of Review

“[T]his Court

may

freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles.”

Perez, 164 Idaho at 628.

C.

On Allmaras’s Failure T0 Take A
Polygraph About The Crime Of Conviction As Ordered By The District Court
The

The

District

Court Relinquished Jurisdiction Based

district court

relinquished jurisdiction over Allmaras because Allmaras refused to take

a polygraph about the crime of conviction as ordered
relinquish jurisdiction based

on the defendant’s

by the

refusal to

district court.

waive the Fifth Amendment and take a

polygraph that could incriminate him in any criminal proceedings.
534, 540, 376 P.3d 738, 744 (2016).
t0 a crime, the risk

As explained

A district court cannot

E

State V.

Komen, 160 Idaho

above, even where a defendant has pled guilty

of incrimination With respect t0 that particular crime persists

until “the sentence

has been ﬁxed and the judgment 0f conviction has become ﬁnal.” Mitchell, 526 U.S.

11

at 326.

Here, the district court found

it

could require a polygraph about the crime of conviction as

a requirement of Allmaras’s rider given that

“it’s

not incriminating because

it’s

not gone t0 any

other act other than the offense t0 Which Mr. Allmaras pled guilty t0.” (4/3/2019 TL, p.15, Ls.4-

12.)

Thus, the question for this Court

is

Whether Allmaras’s sentence had been ﬁxed and his

judgment of conviction had become ﬁnal by the time the

district court

ordered Allmaras to take a

polygraph about the crime 0f conviction during the period of retained jurisdiction.

The

state

acknowledges, again, that Allmaras timely appealed from the judgment of conviction (45821 R.,
pp.152-56), and his appeal

Consolidate).

“either

by

(i.e.,

E M,

this appeal) is still

139 Idaho

at

pending (3/22/2019 Order Granting Motion t0

355, 79 P.3d at 714 (holding judgment becomes ﬁnal

expiration 0f the time for appeal or afﬁrmance 0f the judgment

0n appeal”).

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

court’s order

was not speciﬁc 0r

DATED this

Court reject Allmaras’s argument that the

deﬁnite.

15th day of January, 2020.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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